2025
Ejvind, Hansen
Jürgen Habermas Online
Tække, Jesper; Agger, Gunhild; Kristensen, Nete Nørgaard; Schrøder, Kim (Ed.): 2025, visited: 10.05.2025.
@online{Ejvind2025a,
title = {Jürgen Habermas},
author = {Hansen Ejvind },
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date = {2025-05-10},
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2024
Hansen, Ejvind
Searching for the fourfold in critical discourse analysis Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 50, iss. 9, pp. 1335-1353, 2024, ISSN: 0191-4537.
@article{Hansen2024f,
title = {Searching for the fourfold in critical discourse analysis},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/01914537221145577
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/PreprintGeviertInDiscourseanalysis.pdf
http://offentligheder.dk/diskursanalyse-af-tavsheden/},
doi = {10.1177/01914537221145577},
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journal = {Philosophy & Social Criticism},
volume = {50},
issue = {9},
pages = {1335-1353},
abstract = {This article argues that late Heidegger’s analyses of the Fourfold can be used as a methodological starting point for discourse analyses. It argues that the Fourfold points out elements or foundations of discursive structures that orient us to differing, and to some extent opposing, directions that are at the same time mutually interdependent. A discursive analysis of how the Fourfold is at play in prevailing discursive exchanges and structures will thus be a matter of situating ourselves in a conceptual space beyond existing practices and structures, from which we get a picture of their inadequacies. As such, the article contributes to a critical understanding of discourse analysis. It will be argued that through understanding the Fourfold, we can better understand the problems with various aspects of ‘measuring’, which are founded upon the (concealed) instability of elements of the Fourfold – which shapes practical discursive engagements. By foregrounding this structural instability we can approach it critically. I demonstrate how this approach might be used in an analysis of a debate between Greta Thunberg and Bjørn Lomborg.},
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This article argues that late Heidegger’s analyses of the Fourfold can be used as a methodological starting point for discourse analyses. It argues that the Fourfold points out elements or foundations of discursive structures that orient us to differing, and to some extent opposing, directions that are at the same time mutually interdependent. A discursive analysis of how the Fourfold is at play in prevailing discursive exchanges and structures will thus be a matter of situating ourselves in a conceptual space beyond existing practices and structures, from which we get a picture of their inadequacies. As such, the article contributes to a critical understanding of discourse analysis. It will be argued that through understanding the Fourfold, we can better understand the problems with various aspects of ‘measuring’, which are founded upon the (concealed) instability of elements of the Fourfold – which shapes practical discursive engagements. By foregrounding this structural instability we can approach it critically. I demonstrate how this approach might be used in an analysis of a debate between Greta Thunberg and Bjørn Lomborg.
Hansen, Ejvind
Journalists Gaining Trust Through Silencing of the Self Journal Article
In: SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 25, iss. 1, pp. 49-68, 2024, ISBN: 1869-7577.
@article{Hansen2024c,
title = {Journalists Gaining Trust Through Silencing of the Self},
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url = {https://doi.org/10.1515/sats-2023-0002
https://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/PreprintSilenceTrust.pdf},
doi = {10.1515/sats-2023-0002},
isbn = {1869-7577},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-05-21},
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issue = {1},
pages = {49-68},
abstract = {Journalists depend on two vectors of trust: the trust invested in them by their sources, and the trust invested in them by their end-users. For many years, trust has become a key issue in the articulation of the journalistic profession. This paper distinguishes between two traditional approaches to earn public trust: either through an emphasis on the ideal of objectivity, or by a sort of showing one’s cards: an explicit declaration of one’s subjectivity. Through a reading of Løgstrup, Derrida, and Deleuze, we argue that both positions are inadequate solutions to the problem of trust. In as much as subjectivity is continuously negotiated in interaction with the unknown and the uncontrollable, the poles of objectivity and subjectivity cannot define the narrative event without each supplementing the other. To escape from this impasse, we suggest a third approach: a hospitable journalism characterized by a hospitable attitude towards the uncontrollable and the strange, or unknown, which operates to make the individual more aware of herself and her place in the world. This invitation happens through a silencing of the self.},
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Journalists depend on two vectors of trust: the trust invested in them by their sources, and the trust invested in them by their end-users. For many years, trust has become a key issue in the articulation of the journalistic profession. This paper distinguishes between two traditional approaches to earn public trust: either through an emphasis on the ideal of objectivity, or by a sort of showing one’s cards: an explicit declaration of one’s subjectivity. Through a reading of Løgstrup, Derrida, and Deleuze, we argue that both positions are inadequate solutions to the problem of trust. In as much as subjectivity is continuously negotiated in interaction with the unknown and the uncontrollable, the poles of objectivity and subjectivity cannot define the narrative event without each supplementing the other. To escape from this impasse, we suggest a third approach: a hospitable journalism characterized by a hospitable attitude towards the uncontrollable and the strange, or unknown, which operates to make the individual more aware of herself and her place in the world. This invitation happens through a silencing of the self.
Hansen, Ejvind
The fourth estate operating by means of silencing Journal Article
In: Journalism, vol. 25, iss. 1, pp. 141-157, 2024, ISBN: 1741-3001.
@article{Hansen2024a,
title = {The fourth estate operating by means of silencing},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/PreprintJournalistsImposingSilence.pdf
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14648849221132601
http://offentligheder.dk/den-fjerde-statsmagt-som-udoever-af-tavshed/
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abstract = {The traditional foundation of the placed reserved for the Fourth Estate in democratic practice is under pressure. To revitalize this idea, a focus upon how journalists handle silence professionally is suggested. It is argued that it is important to bring out how the handling of silence is carried out, and to understand that silence is not only something to be avoided. Silence is of foundational importance for communicative significance to emerge. In a reading of Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida, we argue for a model in which silence is necessary for significant communicative exchanges. We avoid thoughtlessness by allotting a function to silence; for communication requires not just information but a channel of silence, so to speak. It is, finally, argued that it is important not to expect the revealed forms of silence to be problematic. It is demonstrated that certain forms of silence can be analysed as democracy enhancing because they permit less heated exchanges that make room for thoughtful contemplation.},
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The traditional foundation of the placed reserved for the Fourth Estate in democratic practice is under pressure. To revitalize this idea, a focus upon how journalists handle silence professionally is suggested. It is argued that it is important to bring out how the handling of silence is carried out, and to understand that silence is not only something to be avoided. Silence is of foundational importance for communicative significance to emerge. In a reading of Deleuze, Heidegger and Derrida, we argue for a model in which silence is necessary for significant communicative exchanges. We avoid thoughtlessness by allotting a function to silence; for communication requires not just information but a channel of silence, so to speak. It is, finally, argued that it is important not to expect the revealed forms of silence to be problematic. It is demonstrated that certain forms of silence can be analysed as democracy enhancing because they permit less heated exchanges that make room for thoughtful contemplation.
2021
Hansen, Ejvind
The Freedom to Remain Silent. The Right to make Qualified Contributions to the Public Sphere Unpublished
2021.
@unpublished{Hansen2021c,
title = {The Freedom to Remain Silent. The Right to make Qualified Contributions to the Public Sphere},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {https://offentligheder.dk/forsvar-doktorafhandling-om-tavshedens-produktive-rolle-i-offentligheden/},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-10-12},
urldate = {2021-10-12},
abstract = {Manuscript handed in with the view to obtain the higher doctoral degree in philosophy (dr. phil -- comparable to the German "Habilitation"). Defended at Aarhus University on December 2023.
This book sets out to turn a centuries-old discussion about a particular aspect of democracy on its head. It has been commonplace since the Enlightenment and the emergence of rationalism to believe that some form of freedom of expression is the path to an enlightened public sphere. While accepting that this is the case, I wish to supplement this line of thought by adding its opposite into the mix. Just as dialogue and information are indispensable ingredients in a functioning democracy, I want to show that silence is also a fundamental prerequisite. With this in mind, I suggest that we supplement thinking about freedom of expression with similar deliberations about freedom of silence. In order to prepare the ground for this, the book sets out to bring forth the significance and importance of silence in the generation of communicative significance. This is done in a reading of Habermas, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, Kierkegaard, (a.o.). In the second half of the book I show how silence can be used critically to create space for thoughtfulness in the democratic spheres that tend to be crowded with an overwhelming amount of discussion.},
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Manuscript handed in with the view to obtain the higher doctoral degree in philosophy (dr. phil -- comparable to the German "Habilitation"). Defended at Aarhus University on December 2023.
This book sets out to turn a centuries-old discussion about a particular aspect of democracy on its head. It has been commonplace since the Enlightenment and the emergence of rationalism to believe that some form of freedom of expression is the path to an enlightened public sphere. While accepting that this is the case, I wish to supplement this line of thought by adding its opposite into the mix. Just as dialogue and information are indispensable ingredients in a functioning democracy, I want to show that silence is also a fundamental prerequisite. With this in mind, I suggest that we supplement thinking about freedom of expression with similar deliberations about freedom of silence. In order to prepare the ground for this, the book sets out to bring forth the significance and importance of silence in the generation of communicative significance. This is done in a reading of Habermas, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, Kierkegaard, (a.o.). In the second half of the book I show how silence can be used critically to create space for thoughtfulness in the democratic spheres that tend to be crowded with an overwhelming amount of discussion.
This book sets out to turn a centuries-old discussion about a particular aspect of democracy on its head. It has been commonplace since the Enlightenment and the emergence of rationalism to believe that some form of freedom of expression is the path to an enlightened public sphere. While accepting that this is the case, I wish to supplement this line of thought by adding its opposite into the mix. Just as dialogue and information are indispensable ingredients in a functioning democracy, I want to show that silence is also a fundamental prerequisite. With this in mind, I suggest that we supplement thinking about freedom of expression with similar deliberations about freedom of silence. In order to prepare the ground for this, the book sets out to bring forth the significance and importance of silence in the generation of communicative significance. This is done in a reading of Habermas, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, Kierkegaard, (a.o.). In the second half of the book I show how silence can be used critically to create space for thoughtfulness in the democratic spheres that tend to be crowded with an overwhelming amount of discussion.
2018
Hansen, Ejvind
The Fourth Estate: the Construction and Place of Silence in the Public Sphere Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 44, no. 10, pp. 1071–1089, 2018, ISSN: 0191-4537.
@article{Hansen2018c,
title = {The Fourth Estate: the Construction and Place of Silence in the Public Sphere},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453718797991
http://offentligheder.dk/for-lidt-tavshed-i-offentligheden/
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_SilenceAndDeliberation.pdf},
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year = {2018},
date = {2018-11-21},
journal = {Philosophy & Social Criticism},
volume = {44},
number = {10},
pages = {1071–1089},
abstract = {The main narratives of prevailing ideas of the Fourth Estate were articulated in the era of traditional mass media, and these traditional narratives are challenged by the changing media landscapes. This raises the question whether traditional narratives of the Fourth Estate should be maintained. We will argue – through a close reading of Derrida’s reflections on the relationship between communicative significance and silence, combined with a deliberative ideal for democracy – that the new structures of communication call for a Fourth Estate that focuses on creating spaces for flexible structures of silence in the public sphere. The Fourth Estate has an obvious assignment of counteracting problematic structures of silence (if certain important voices are not being heard). In this paper we will, however, bring out assignments of creating spaces of silence in the public sphere: By (a) silencing certain dominant voices, (b) making room for an increased lack of answers, and (c) creating an awareness of the insufficiencies of the public spheres.},
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The main narratives of prevailing ideas of the Fourth Estate were articulated in the era of traditional mass media, and these traditional narratives are challenged by the changing media landscapes. This raises the question whether traditional narratives of the Fourth Estate should be maintained. We will argue – through a close reading of Derrida’s reflections on the relationship between communicative significance and silence, combined with a deliberative ideal for democracy – that the new structures of communication call for a Fourth Estate that focuses on creating spaces for flexible structures of silence in the public sphere. The Fourth Estate has an obvious assignment of counteracting problematic structures of silence (if certain important voices are not being heard). In this paper we will, however, bring out assignments of creating spaces of silence in the public sphere: By (a) silencing certain dominant voices, (b) making room for an increased lack of answers, and (c) creating an awareness of the insufficiencies of the public spheres.
Hansen, Ejvind
Deliberation and Forgiveness in the Public Sphere Journal Article
In: Critical Horizons. A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 49-66, 2018.
@article{Hansen2018b,
title = {Deliberation and Forgiveness in the Public Sphere},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14409917.2017.1376935
http://offentligheder.dk/tilgivende-refleksion/
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year = {2018},
date = {2018-01-18},
journal = {Critical Horizons. A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory},
volume = {19},
number = {1},
pages = {49-66},
abstract = {A common objection to the argument for deliberative democracy is that it cannot provide mechanisms for achieving its ideal of all-inclusiveness. This does, however, not in itself refute the deliberative ideal. In a reading of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida’s writings on forgiveness, we argue that forgiving involves a renegotiation of our enemies and of ourselves. Hereby a renegotiation of the seemingly unbridgeable understandings of who our enemies are can be achieved. Forgiving involves a realisation that we have something in common with our foes. This opens the question: Why did our paths separate? We become puzzled and start to search for reasons. This does not mean that we have to accept ways of life that we detest. But it does mean that we need to be able to articulate counter arguments. Hereby limitations of prevailing understandings of who to include in deliberative processes can be overcome.},
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A common objection to the argument for deliberative democracy is that it cannot provide mechanisms for achieving its ideal of all-inclusiveness. This does, however, not in itself refute the deliberative ideal. In a reading of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Derrida’s writings on forgiveness, we argue that forgiving involves a renegotiation of our enemies and of ourselves. Hereby a renegotiation of the seemingly unbridgeable understandings of who our enemies are can be achieved. Forgiving involves a realisation that we have something in common with our foes. This opens the question: Why did our paths separate? We become puzzled and start to search for reasons. This does not mean that we have to accept ways of life that we detest. But it does mean that we need to be able to articulate counter arguments. Hereby limitations of prevailing understandings of who to include in deliberative processes can be overcome.
2017
Hansen, Ejvind
Tal! – sammen Book
Forlaget Mindspace, 2017, ISBN: 978-87-93535-16-9.
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title = {Tal! – sammen},
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url = {http://www.forlagetmindspace.dk/udgivelser/skolen-for-livet/tal-sammen
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isbn = {978-87-93535-16-9},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-11-08},
publisher = {Forlaget Mindspace},
abstract = {Samtaler skaber og ødelægger liv. Samtaler åbner for verden ved at lukke for den. For at kunne samtale er vi nødt til dyrke tavsheden. Vi kan kun sikre ytringsfriheden ved at begrænse den.
Tal! - sammen handler om sådanne paradokser i samtaler, som vi ikke kan løse, men som vi alligevel må forsøge at løsne op for. Ved at forstå hvordan vi kan begrunde vores talehandlinger og talefrihed, kan vi se, hvilken magt talen har og hvordan vi kan blive bedre til at tale på en måde, der åbner for rummelige fællesskaber, hvor flest muligt har indflydelse, og hvor vi gennem vores forskellighed udfordrer hinanden til en bred, nysgerrig og nuanceret forståelse af forhold i verden.
Den gode samtale forudsætter, at vi lærer at reflektere over samtalens grænser og indimellem at holde mund.
Bogen er en let tilgængelig introduktion til samtalens betingelser og henvender sig til studerende og professionelle, der arbejder med kommunikation.},
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Samtaler skaber og ødelægger liv. Samtaler åbner for verden ved at lukke for den. For at kunne samtale er vi nødt til dyrke tavsheden. Vi kan kun sikre ytringsfriheden ved at begrænse den.
Tal! - sammen handler om sådanne paradokser i samtaler, som vi ikke kan løse, men som vi alligevel må forsøge at løsne op for. Ved at forstå hvordan vi kan begrunde vores talehandlinger og talefrihed, kan vi se, hvilken magt talen har og hvordan vi kan blive bedre til at tale på en måde, der åbner for rummelige fællesskaber, hvor flest muligt har indflydelse, og hvor vi gennem vores forskellighed udfordrer hinanden til en bred, nysgerrig og nuanceret forståelse af forhold i verden.
Den gode samtale forudsætter, at vi lærer at reflektere over samtalens grænser og indimellem at holde mund.
Bogen er en let tilgængelig introduktion til samtalens betingelser og henvender sig til studerende og professionelle, der arbejder med kommunikation.
Tal! - sammen handler om sådanne paradokser i samtaler, som vi ikke kan løse, men som vi alligevel må forsøge at løsne op for. Ved at forstå hvordan vi kan begrunde vores talehandlinger og talefrihed, kan vi se, hvilken magt talen har og hvordan vi kan blive bedre til at tale på en måde, der åbner for rummelige fællesskaber, hvor flest muligt har indflydelse, og hvor vi gennem vores forskellighed udfordrer hinanden til en bred, nysgerrig og nuanceret forståelse af forhold i verden.
Den gode samtale forudsætter, at vi lærer at reflektere over samtalens grænser og indimellem at holde mund.
Bogen er en let tilgængelig introduktion til samtalens betingelser og henvender sig til studerende og professionelle, der arbejder med kommunikation.
2016
Hansen, Ejvind
Hackers in Hiding: a Foucaultian Analysis Journal Article
In: Philosophy & Technology, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 5-19, 2016, ISSN: 2210-5433.
@article{Hansen2016b,
title = {Hackers in Hiding: a Foucaultian Analysis},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-014-0182-7
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_MFHacking.pdf},
doi = {10.1007/s13347-014-0182-7},
issn = {2210-5433},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-03-01},
journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
volume = {29},
number = {1},
pages = {5-19},
abstract = {On several occasions Michel Foucault advocated a methodological turn towards what he called a “happy positivism”. Foucault’s emphasis on the surface does not deny the importance of structures of hiding, but understands it as a game in which the structures of hiding are viewed as contingently given. In this paper I will analyse the conflict between the hacker movement and the field of corporate interests. I argue that the introduction of graphical user interfaces and the maintaining of copyright interests are the contingent background of the ongoing conflict. By bracketing the analyses of hidden intentional structures, the happy positivist is thus able to facilitate deeper understandings of the prevailing structures of hiding.},
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On several occasions Michel Foucault advocated a methodological turn towards what he called a “happy positivism”. Foucault’s emphasis on the surface does not deny the importance of structures of hiding, but understands it as a game in which the structures of hiding are viewed as contingently given. In this paper I will analyse the conflict between the hacker movement and the field of corporate interests. I argue that the introduction of graphical user interfaces and the maintaining of copyright interests are the contingent background of the ongoing conflict. By bracketing the analyses of hidden intentional structures, the happy positivist is thus able to facilitate deeper understandings of the prevailing structures of hiding.
2015
Hansen, Ejvind
Journalistik som en hermeneutisk og dekonstruktiv intervention i den distribuerede offentlighed Journal Article
In: Journalistica - Tidsskrift for forskning i journalistik, no. 1, pp. 96-115, 2015, ISSN: 1904-7967.
@article{Hansen2015e,
title = {Journalistik som en hermeneutisk og dekonstruktiv intervention i den distribuerede offentlighed},
author = {Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://tidsskrift.dk/index.php/journalistica/article/view/22980},
issn = {1904-7967},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-12-30},
urldate = {2015-12-30},
journal = {Journalistica - Tidsskrift for forskning i journalistik},
number = {1},
pages = {96-115},
abstract = {Internettet har sat nye betingelser for den demokratiske offentlighed. Den journalistiske praksis er født ind i nogle opgaver, der opstod sammen med massemediernes fremkomst. I takt med at de traditionelle massemedier (tryk, radio, tv) afløses af internetmedier, rejser spørgsmålet sig, om vi stadig har brug for journalistikken. Jeg vil argumentere for, at der i forhold til idealer om en deliberativ offentlighed ligger tre overordnede journalistiske opgaver: (a) traditionelle opgaver som formidling, efterforskning og kritik; (b) moderation af dialoger (sikre en passende diversitet mellem de talende); (c) moderation af tavshed (give stemme til de tavse interesser i samfundet).},
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Internettet har sat nye betingelser for den demokratiske offentlighed. Den journalistiske praksis er født ind i nogle opgaver, der opstod sammen med massemediernes fremkomst. I takt med at de traditionelle massemedier (tryk, radio, tv) afløses af internetmedier, rejser spørgsmålet sig, om vi stadig har brug for journalistikken. Jeg vil argumentere for, at der i forhold til idealer om en deliberativ offentlighed ligger tre overordnede journalistiske opgaver: (a) traditionelle opgaver som formidling, efterforskning og kritik; (b) moderation af dialoger (sikre en passende diversitet mellem de talende); (c) moderation af tavshed (give stemme til de tavse interesser i samfundet).
2013
Hansen, Ejvind
Critique as Lending Voice to the Mystical Journal Article
In: SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 142–152, 2013.
@article{Hansen2013d,
title = {Critique as Lending Voice to the Mystical},
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http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_CritiqueLendingVoiceMystical.pdf},
doi = {10.1515/sats-2013-0008. },
year = {2013},
date = {2013-01-01},
journal = {SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy},
volume = {14},
number = {2},
pages = {142--152},
abstract = {In this paper, I contemplate the relationship between two apparently opposing approaches to critical theory: one privileges the focus on the rational coherence of discourse (which is characteristic, for instance, of Habermas), while the other privileges the focus upon experiential world disclosure (which is characteristic of those influenced by Heidegger). I will suggest that these two approaches complement each other in that they accentuate two different dimensions of intellectual and practical approaches towards the world: the quest for systematicity and the quest for adequacy. Habermas’ claim that critique that is not based in the protocols of rational coherence quickly becomes obscurantist and reactionary does admittedly articulate an important point in relation to critical reflection when it aims at articulating alternatives to an entrenched power structure. It will, however, be argued that critical reflection also needs an openness towards alternative narratives that are not bounded by fixed truthclaims, but rather operate through problematising the prevailing horizons of truth. This will be my starting point for suggesting that the critical aspect of world-disclosing approaches consists in their showing alternative potentialities - rather than alternative realities. In order to carry out this argument, I propose a distinction between rationality, irrationality and the non-rational, which leads to the claim that it is not irrational for rationality to be contemplated in relation to the non-rational.},
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In this paper, I contemplate the relationship between two apparently opposing approaches to critical theory: one privileges the focus on the rational coherence of discourse (which is characteristic, for instance, of Habermas), while the other privileges the focus upon experiential world disclosure (which is characteristic of those influenced by Heidegger). I will suggest that these two approaches complement each other in that they accentuate two different dimensions of intellectual and practical approaches towards the world: the quest for systematicity and the quest for adequacy. Habermas’ claim that critique that is not based in the protocols of rational coherence quickly becomes obscurantist and reactionary does admittedly articulate an important point in relation to critical reflection when it aims at articulating alternatives to an entrenched power structure. It will, however, be argued that critical reflection also needs an openness towards alternative narratives that are not bounded by fixed truthclaims, but rather operate through problematising the prevailing horizons of truth. This will be my starting point for suggesting that the critical aspect of world-disclosing approaches consists in their showing alternative potentialities - rather than alternative realities. In order to carry out this argument, I propose a distinction between rationality, irrationality and the non-rational, which leads to the claim that it is not irrational for rationality to be contemplated in relation to the non-rational.
2011
Hansen, Ejvind
Den dialog-udfordrende journalist Book Section
In: Buch, Roger (Ed.): Forandringens journalistik. 40 års tilbageblik, pp. 97–117, Forlaget Ajour, Aarhus, 2011, ISBN: 978-87-92816-03-0.
@incollection{Hansen2011a,
title = {Den dialog-udfordrende journalist},
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editor = {Roger Buch},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/018DenDialogUdfordrendeJournalist.PDF},
isbn = {978-87-92816-03-0},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-01-01},
booktitle = {Forandringens journalistik. 40 års tilbageblik},
pages = {97--117},
publisher = {Forlaget Ajour},
address = {Aarhus},
abstract = {Da lovforslaget om “Danmarks Journalisthøjskole og Institut for Presseforskning” blev vedtaget i 1970 og realiseret i 1971, blev journalistikkens rolle i samfundet kodificeret. I de samme år fandt imidlertid også en kommunikationsteknologisk revolution sted, som på sigt kom til at etablere en udfordring i den journalistiske selvforståelse. Betydningen af disse hændelser og opfindelser kunne man ikke forudse i 1971, men fra 40-års perspektivet etablerer dannelsen af Journalisthøjskolen og Internettets fremvækst to hændelser en tydelig dialektik, som i dag udgør en uomgængelig udfordring for journalistikken. Internet teknologierne har på den ene side lettet mange journalistiske processer. På den anden side bliver journalistens “monopol” som vidensformidler og formidler af kontakt mellem magthavere og befolkning også udfordret.Internettet har ofte været anset for at være et muligt værktøj til at effektivisere den journalistiske opgave. Jeg argumenterer imidlertid for, at Internettet radikalt forandrer hele relationen i den offentlige sfære, så den kommunikative udfordring forflytter sig. Snarere end at skulle bøvle med at bringe den rette information frem til modtagerne, bliver udfordringen nu, hvordan man faciliterer en åben og kritisk udfordrende dialog. Til dette formål må vi have nyere argumentative analyseværktøjer som diskursanalyse og dekonstruktion til hjælp. Kun herved kan journalister håbe på at løse den journalistiske udfordring: At udvikle og afgrænse rum for dialog – i forhold til passende grader af uenighed mellem deltagerne.},
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Da lovforslaget om “Danmarks Journalisthøjskole og Institut for Presseforskning” blev vedtaget i 1970 og realiseret i 1971, blev journalistikkens rolle i samfundet kodificeret. I de samme år fandt imidlertid også en kommunikationsteknologisk revolution sted, som på sigt kom til at etablere en udfordring i den journalistiske selvforståelse. Betydningen af disse hændelser og opfindelser kunne man ikke forudse i 1971, men fra 40-års perspektivet etablerer dannelsen af Journalisthøjskolen og Internettets fremvækst to hændelser en tydelig dialektik, som i dag udgør en uomgængelig udfordring for journalistikken. Internet teknologierne har på den ene side lettet mange journalistiske processer. På den anden side bliver journalistens “monopol” som vidensformidler og formidler af kontakt mellem magthavere og befolkning også udfordret.Internettet har ofte været anset for at være et muligt værktøj til at effektivisere den journalistiske opgave. Jeg argumenterer imidlertid for, at Internettet radikalt forandrer hele relationen i den offentlige sfære, så den kommunikative udfordring forflytter sig. Snarere end at skulle bøvle med at bringe den rette information frem til modtagerne, bliver udfordringen nu, hvordan man faciliterer en åben og kritisk udfordrende dialog. Til dette formål må vi have nyere argumentative analyseværktøjer som diskursanalyse og dekonstruktion til hjælp. Kun herved kan journalister håbe på at løse den journalistiske udfordring: At udvikle og afgrænse rum for dialog – i forhold til passende grader af uenighed mellem deltagerne.
2010
Hansen, Ejvind
Kantian antinomies in digital communications media Journal Article
In: Telos, vol. 150, pp. 137–142, 2010.
@article{Hansen2010a,
title = {Kantian antinomies in digital communications media},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://journal.telospress.com/content/2010/150/137.short
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doi = {10.3817/0310150137},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-01-01},
urldate = {2010-01-01},
journal = {Telos},
volume = {150},
pages = {137--142},
abstract = {In this statement I contemplate the relationship between the Kantian antinomies and modern digital communicative media. The antinomies demonstrate that knowledge is decisively indeterminate. The indeterminate character of our knowledge is an important source for critical reflection. Since we are inevitably bound up in a dialectics between finitude and infinitude, we are never allowed to fall back into a self-assured conviction of the infallibility of our understanding. I do, however, demonstrate that digital media are characterized by a fundamental finitude. This poses a potential bias in digitally mediated communication of which it is important to be aware. Kantian transcendental dialectics thus proves to be relevant in framing our communication within the digital systems – and in the creation of new media. The point is not that there is never room for critical reflection in digital media, but rather that digital media in certain respects diminishes our awareness of the need for critical reflection.},
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In this statement I contemplate the relationship between the Kantian antinomies and modern digital communicative media. The antinomies demonstrate that knowledge is decisively indeterminate. The indeterminate character of our knowledge is an important source for critical reflection. Since we are inevitably bound up in a dialectics between finitude and infinitude, we are never allowed to fall back into a self-assured conviction of the infallibility of our understanding. I do, however, demonstrate that digital media are characterized by a fundamental finitude. This poses a potential bias in digitally mediated communication of which it is important to be aware. Kantian transcendental dialectics thus proves to be relevant in framing our communication within the digital systems – and in the creation of new media. The point is not that there is never room for critical reflection in digital media, but rather that digital media in certain respects diminishes our awareness of the need for critical reflection.
Hansen, Ejvind
Kants deduktion af de rene forstandsbegrebers nødvendighed Book Section
In: Nielsen, Carsten Fogh (Ed.): Erkendelse, moral og system : otte læsninger i Kants filosofi, pp. 73–91, Philosophia Press, Aarhus, 2010, ISBN: 978-87-88663-69-3.
@incollection{Hansen2010c,
title = {Kants deduktion af de rene forstandsbegrebers nødvendighed},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
editor = {Carsten Fogh Nielsen},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_KantsDeduktion.pdf},
isbn = {978-87-88663-69-3},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-01-01},
urldate = {2010-01-01},
booktitle = {Erkendelse, moral og system : otte læsninger i Kants filosofi},
pages = {73--91},
publisher = {Philosophia Press},
address = {Aarhus},
abstract = {Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (herefter KrV – 1781 og 1787) er et komplekst værk, der på mange måder forsøger at samle mange af de filosofiske diskussioner, som florerede i den engelske, franske og tyske filosofi i 1700-tallet. Derfor er det også vanskeligt at afgøre, hvilke dele af bogen, der er de vigtigste – det kommer an på hvad ens ærinde med at læse bogen er. Men det vil nok ikke være at tage munden for fuld at påstå, at de 47 (A-udgaven) + 54 (B-udgaven) sider som Kant kalder “Von der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe” (“Om deduktionen af de rene forstandsbegreber” – KrV A84-130+B116-69) sammen med Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) hører til de mest diskuterede tekster i forfatterskabet.For deduktionens vedkommende kan dette forklares med, at projektet for det første er meget ambitiøst: At vise at erkendelse af objektive genstande forudsætter begrebslig enhed. Hertil kommer for det andet, at Kant har skrevet to udgaver af deduktionen, der er meget forskellige. Det har derfor været en pågående diskussion, hvorvidt målet med de to udgaver er det samme.For det tredje mener jeg også, at Kants kapitel-opdeling af KrV forvirrer, da man med en vis ret kan sige, at deduktionens bevis fortsætter i den efterfølgende transcendentale grundsætningsanalytik. I deduktionen vises blot nødvendigheden af forstandsmæssig syntese som sådan. I grundsætningsanalytikken viser Kant de enkelte forstandsbegrebers nødvendighed for at kunne give enhed til anskuelsesformen tid (skematismen). Desuden er redegørelsen for hvilke grundsætninger, der udspringer heraf, afgørende for forståelsen af, på hvilken måde forstandsbegreberne er nødvendige – deduktionerne ender ud med en meget abstrakt forståelse af, hvad erkendelse vil sige.},
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Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (herefter KrV – 1781 og 1787) er et komplekst værk, der på mange måder forsøger at samle mange af de filosofiske diskussioner, som florerede i den engelske, franske og tyske filosofi i 1700-tallet. Derfor er det også vanskeligt at afgøre, hvilke dele af bogen, der er de vigtigste – det kommer an på hvad ens ærinde med at læse bogen er. Men det vil nok ikke være at tage munden for fuld at påstå, at de 47 (A-udgaven) + 54 (B-udgaven) sider som Kant kalder “Von der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe” (“Om deduktionen af de rene forstandsbegreber” – KrV A84-130+B116-69) sammen med Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785) hører til de mest diskuterede tekster i forfatterskabet.For deduktionens vedkommende kan dette forklares med, at projektet for det første er meget ambitiøst: At vise at erkendelse af objektive genstande forudsætter begrebslig enhed. Hertil kommer for det andet, at Kant har skrevet to udgaver af deduktionen, der er meget forskellige. Det har derfor været en pågående diskussion, hvorvidt målet med de to udgaver er det samme.For det tredje mener jeg også, at Kants kapitel-opdeling af KrV forvirrer, da man med en vis ret kan sige, at deduktionens bevis fortsætter i den efterfølgende transcendentale grundsætningsanalytik. I deduktionen vises blot nødvendigheden af forstandsmæssig syntese som sådan. I grundsætningsanalytikken viser Kant de enkelte forstandsbegrebers nødvendighed for at kunne give enhed til anskuelsesformen tid (skematismen). Desuden er redegørelsen for hvilke grundsætninger, der udspringer heraf, afgørende for forståelsen af, på hvilken måde forstandsbegreberne er nødvendige – deduktionerne ender ud med en meget abstrakt forståelse af, hvad erkendelse vil sige.
2009
Hansen, Ejvind
Aflivningen af spøgelserne i professionerne Journal Article
In: Gjallerhorn, no. 9, pp. 78–84, 2009.
@article{Hansen2009c,
title = {Aflivningen af spøgelserne i professionerne},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://www.via.dk/-/media/VIA/dk/om-via/presse/dokumenter/publikationer/tidsskrift-for-professionsstudier/gjallerhorn-9-professionel-doemmekraft.pdf?la=da
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year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
journal = {Gjallerhorn},
number = {9},
pages = {78--84},
abstract = {Vi har de senere år fra politisk hold set et stigende krav om, at ydelserne indenfor det offentlige skal kunne dokumenteres, evalueres og ydes efter den ansvarlige borgers selvstændigt formulerede ønsker. Det kan der være mange gode grunde til. Jeg vil imidlertid argumentere for, at kravet om dokumentation, evaluering og ansvarliggørelse af den enkelte borger også bærer på en række problematiske side-effekter. Kravene indebærer nemlig et øget pres for at eksplicitere hvad den enkelte ydelse går ud på. En sådan eksplicitering fører til et øget fokus på visse aspekter af professionerne. Men vi risikerer at miste blikket for noget helt særligt ved mange af professionerne – nemlig dette at de ikke primært er teoretisk ekspliciterbare, men i meget høj grad bygger på en praktisk dømmekraft, som principielt set ikke lader sig eksplicitere.Derfor oplever mange professionelle i det offentlige i disse år et tab af anerkendelse, som har givet sig til udtryk i de seneste års forholdsvist forkrampede forhandlinger omkring overenskomster og bevillinger til de enkelte områder. Problemet er, at hvis man fokuserer for snævert på det ekspliciterbare, så mister man bl.a. blikket for den “kunnen”, der ligger i, at gøre tingene på en helt særlig og nærværende måde – at gøre tingene med omsorg. Vi kan ikke rigtig sætte præcise ord på, hvorhenne omsorgen ydes, og hvor meget der findes af den. Men vi “fornemmer” dens tilstedeværelse (eller mangel på samme). Omsorgen er på en måde mystisk. Den er noget vi ikke rigtig kan artikulere os ud af – men dermed ikke være sagt, at den ikke er vigtig. Den er et tavst, anklagende blik, der udfordrer den praksis, der er blevet mekaniseret af eksternt definerede regler. Den er et spøgelse – og som sådan, er den meget vigtig.For at forstå rimeligheden i denne påstand, er det imidlertid vigtigt at diskutere en distinktion mellem det teoretiske og dømmekraften.},
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Vi har de senere år fra politisk hold set et stigende krav om, at ydelserne indenfor det offentlige skal kunne dokumenteres, evalueres og ydes efter den ansvarlige borgers selvstændigt formulerede ønsker. Det kan der være mange gode grunde til. Jeg vil imidlertid argumentere for, at kravet om dokumentation, evaluering og ansvarliggørelse af den enkelte borger også bærer på en række problematiske side-effekter. Kravene indebærer nemlig et øget pres for at eksplicitere hvad den enkelte ydelse går ud på. En sådan eksplicitering fører til et øget fokus på visse aspekter af professionerne. Men vi risikerer at miste blikket for noget helt særligt ved mange af professionerne – nemlig dette at de ikke primært er teoretisk ekspliciterbare, men i meget høj grad bygger på en praktisk dømmekraft, som principielt set ikke lader sig eksplicitere.Derfor oplever mange professionelle i det offentlige i disse år et tab af anerkendelse, som har givet sig til udtryk i de seneste års forholdsvist forkrampede forhandlinger omkring overenskomster og bevillinger til de enkelte områder. Problemet er, at hvis man fokuserer for snævert på det ekspliciterbare, så mister man bl.a. blikket for den “kunnen”, der ligger i, at gøre tingene på en helt særlig og nærværende måde – at gøre tingene med omsorg. Vi kan ikke rigtig sætte præcise ord på, hvorhenne omsorgen ydes, og hvor meget der findes af den. Men vi “fornemmer” dens tilstedeværelse (eller mangel på samme). Omsorgen er på en måde mystisk. Den er noget vi ikke rigtig kan artikulere os ud af – men dermed ikke være sagt, at den ikke er vigtig. Den er et tavst, anklagende blik, der udfordrer den praksis, der er blevet mekaniseret af eksternt definerede regler. Den er et spøgelse – og som sådan, er den meget vigtig.For at forstå rimeligheden i denne påstand, er det imidlertid vigtigt at diskutere en distinktion mellem det teoretiske og dømmekraften.
Hansen, Ejvind
The Hegelian Notion of Progress and Its Applicability in Critical Philosophy Book Section
In: Grøn, Arne; Raffnsøe-Møller, Morten; Sørensen, Asger (Ed.): Dialectics, SelfConsciousness, and Recognition : The Hegelian Legacy, pp. 201–227, Aarhus Universitetsforlag/NSU Press, Aarhus, 2009, ISBN: 978-87-87564-11-3.
@incollection{Hansen2009d,
title = {The Hegelian Notion of Progress and Its Applicability in Critical Philosophy},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
editor = {Arne Grøn and Morten Raffnsøe-Møller and Asger Sørensen},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_TheHegelianNotionOfProgress.pdf},
isbn = {978-87-87564-11-3},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
urldate = {2009-01-01},
booktitle = {Dialectics, SelfConsciousness, and Recognition : The Hegelian Legacy},
pages = {201--227},
publisher = {Aarhus Universitetsforlag/NSU Press},
address = {Aarhus},
abstract = {In this paper I discuss the relevance of the Hegelian notion of progress in relation to problems in present-day discussions of critical theory. I discuss Honneth’s attempt to maintain the Hegelian notion of progress without subscribing to its metaphysical foundations. I argue that Honneth’s strategies are not likely to succeed and that he does not actually need the robust notion of progress in order for his critical theory to have significant implications. It will, however, force critical theory to rearticulate its aims. Critical theory reveals norms for locating disagreement rather than solving conflicts.},
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In this paper I discuss the relevance of the Hegelian notion of progress in relation to problems in present-day discussions of critical theory. I discuss Honneth’s attempt to maintain the Hegelian notion of progress without subscribing to its metaphysical foundations. I argue that Honneth’s strategies are not likely to succeed and that he does not actually need the robust notion of progress in order for his critical theory to have significant implications. It will, however, force critical theory to rearticulate its aims. Critical theory reveals norms for locating disagreement rather than solving conflicts.
Hansen, Ejvind
Recognition as a reference point for a concept of progress in critical theory Journal Article
In: Critical Horizons, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 99–117, 2009.
@article{Hansen2009a,
title = {Recognition as a reference point for a concept of progress in critical theory},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1558/crit.v10i1.99
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_RecognitionAndProgressCriticalTheory.pdf},
doi = {10.1558/crit.v10i1.99},
year = {2009},
date = {2009-01-01},
journal = {Critical Horizons},
volume = {10},
number = {1},
pages = {99--117},
abstract = {In this paper I discuss the recent attempt of Axel Honneth of establishing a robust notion of progress through reference to recognitive structures. I claim that two strategies can be found in his writings for founding such a claim. On the one hand he tries to found the notion of progress on how differentiated the recognitive structures are. On the other hand he tries to found it on certain empirically revealed anthropological and psychological constants. I argue that both strategies fail. The differentiation-strategy is too open, the psychological strategy is too narrow.I discuss in what sense Honneth’s reflections on the importance of recognitive structures still may be of value in critical discussions. Even though it may be granted that a certain notion of progress is inevitable in critical discussions, it does not follow that it has to be a robust notion. I suggest that recognitive structures may serve as a universal reference point that can be used to locate disagreement (recognitive structures are always at play), rather than a robust universal starting point that can be used solve disagreement (it is not given that we agree upon which recognitive structures should be furthered).},
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In this paper I discuss the recent attempt of Axel Honneth of establishing a robust notion of progress through reference to recognitive structures. I claim that two strategies can be found in his writings for founding such a claim. On the one hand he tries to found the notion of progress on how differentiated the recognitive structures are. On the other hand he tries to found it on certain empirically revealed anthropological and psychological constants. I argue that both strategies fail. The differentiation-strategy is too open, the psychological strategy is too narrow.I discuss in what sense Honneth’s reflections on the importance of recognitive structures still may be of value in critical discussions. Even though it may be granted that a certain notion of progress is inevitable in critical discussions, it does not follow that it has to be a robust notion. I suggest that recognitive structures may serve as a universal reference point that can be used to locate disagreement (recognitive structures are always at play), rather than a robust universal starting point that can be used solve disagreement (it is not given that we agree upon which recognitive structures should be furthered).
2008
Hansen, Ejvind
Det digitale spøgelse Book Section
In: Hansen, Ejvind; Kreutzfeldt, Danny; Sylvestersen, Inge (Ed.): Digitale mellemværender, pp. 108–131, Philosophia, Aarhus, 2008, ISBN: 9788788663426.
@incollection{Hansen2008a,
title = {Det digitale spøgelse},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
editor = {Ejvind Hansen and Danny Kreutzfeldt and Inge Sylvestersen},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/Preprint_DetDigitaleSpøgelse.pdf},
isbn = {9788788663426},
year = {2008},
date = {2008-01-01},
booktitle = {Digitale mellemværender},
pages = {108--131},
publisher = {Philosophia},
address = {Aarhus},
abstract = {Spørgsmålet som denne artikel skal reflektere over lyder: "Hvilken betydning har kommunikationens digitalisering for den kritiske dialog?"Dette kan man ikke give et endeligt svar på – og da slet ikke i en artikel, der passer ind i en antologi. Så alt efter hvilket fokus, man vælger at lægge, vil man kunne komme med forskellige svar. Jeg vil primært fokusere på de internetbårne medier. Her skal man ikke være en stor analytiker for at vise, at de digitale medier på mange måder har givet rum for kritiske røster. I denne artikel vil jeg imidlertid prøve at udpege nogle strukturer i disse medier, som kan medføre en vis blindhed overfor nødvendigheden af kritisk refleksion. En blindhed, der udspringer af et manglende overblik, og en overdreven begejstring over mediets effektivitet. I denne analyse vil jeg særligt trække på Jacques Derrida, der i sine skrifter reflekterede meget over mediernes indflydelse på kommunikationen og tænkningen.},
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Spørgsmålet som denne artikel skal reflektere over lyder: "Hvilken betydning har kommunikationens digitalisering for den kritiske dialog?"Dette kan man ikke give et endeligt svar på – og da slet ikke i en artikel, der passer ind i en antologi. Så alt efter hvilket fokus, man vælger at lægge, vil man kunne komme med forskellige svar. Jeg vil primært fokusere på de internetbårne medier. Her skal man ikke være en stor analytiker for at vise, at de digitale medier på mange måder har givet rum for kritiske røster. I denne artikel vil jeg imidlertid prøve at udpege nogle strukturer i disse medier, som kan medføre en vis blindhed overfor nødvendigheden af kritisk refleksion. En blindhed, der udspringer af et manglende overblik, og en overdreven begejstring over mediets effektivitet. I denne analyse vil jeg særligt trække på Jacques Derrida, der i sine skrifter reflekterede meget over mediernes indflydelse på kommunikationen og tænkningen.
2005
Hansen, Ejvind
Embedded Critique in a Tensed World PhD Thesis
2005.
@phdthesis{Hansen2005d,
title = {Embedded Critique in a Tensed World},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/PhDExtendedAbstract.pdf
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/PhDThesis.pdf},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-01-01},
urldate = {2005-01-01},
abstract = {In this thesis I investigate the conditions for critique in the light of the postmodern insight that critique cannot be based upon a universally valid starting point. A usual reaction to this insight has been what I call descriptivism: if critique cannot have one fixed starting point, it is probably best not to criticize at all. I argue that this reaction is wrong. Descriptivism does on the one hand not solve the problem from which it originates: the description is itself embedded in a contingent validity. The postmodern insight does on the other hand not necessarily lead to absolute relativity: every normative perspective has to respond to some kind of reality, and this can be a starting point for critique. Finally, descriptivism is founded on the mistaken assumption that various normative perspectives are isolated in relation to each other.
I argue that the postmodern insights point towards a moderate relativism as opposed to absolute staticism and absolute relativism. Any linguistic expression (critical as well as descriptive) is characterized by being locally founded, but also by pointing beyond this local foundation. We should therefore think of linguistic expressions as pointing in a universalizing direction but in a fallible way. This is why the critical investigation is always relevant. And it is thuys a mistake to seek to avoid critical implications of linguistic expressions.},
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In this thesis I investigate the conditions for critique in the light of the postmodern insight that critique cannot be based upon a universally valid starting point. A usual reaction to this insight has been what I call descriptivism: if critique cannot have one fixed starting point, it is probably best not to criticize at all. I argue that this reaction is wrong. Descriptivism does on the one hand not solve the problem from which it originates: the description is itself embedded in a contingent validity. The postmodern insight does on the other hand not necessarily lead to absolute relativity: every normative perspective has to respond to some kind of reality, and this can be a starting point for critique. Finally, descriptivism is founded on the mistaken assumption that various normative perspectives are isolated in relation to each other.
I argue that the postmodern insights point towards a moderate relativism as opposed to absolute staticism and absolute relativism. Any linguistic expression (critical as well as descriptive) is characterized by being locally founded, but also by pointing beyond this local foundation. We should therefore think of linguistic expressions as pointing in a universalizing direction but in a fallible way. This is why the critical investigation is always relevant. And it is thuys a mistake to seek to avoid critical implications of linguistic expressions.
I argue that the postmodern insights point towards a moderate relativism as opposed to absolute staticism and absolute relativism. Any linguistic expression (critical as well as descriptive) is characterized by being locally founded, but also by pointing beyond this local foundation. We should therefore think of linguistic expressions as pointing in a universalizing direction but in a fallible way. This is why the critical investigation is always relevant. And it is thuys a mistake to seek to avoid critical implications of linguistic expressions.
Hansen, Ejvind
The Foucault-Habermas Debate: the Reflexive and Receptive Aspects of Critique Journal Article
In: Telos, vol. 130, pp. 63–83, 2005.
@article{Hansen2005b,
title = {The Foucault-Habermas Debate: the Reflexive and Receptive Aspects of Critique},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://journal.telospress.com/content/2005/130/63.abstract
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/007JH_MF_telos_facing.pdf},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-01-01},
journal = {Telos},
volume = {130},
pages = {63--83},
abstract = {In the field of critical philosophy, the view of Michel Foucault has been subject to very extensive discussion. It has been an ongoing puzzlement how he could reject any talk about ahistorical universals and at the same time claim philosophy – at least in its genealogic form – to be of critical importance. How could he claim any analysis to have only local significance, and at the same time take the view that some analyses can show other views to be problematic? According to what standards?A common strategy against Foucault has been to state that he is not as neutral as he claims to be – that underneath his analysis of, say, prison (Discipline and Punish – 1975) or sexuality (The History of Sexuality 1-3 – 1976/1984) there is a hidden universal normativity that shapes his critique of these fields. Another approach to the seemingly paradox claim by Foucault has been to deny the critical aspect of his work. This has been Jürgen Habermas’ strategy – most thoroughly carried out in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985). In the following I will try to articulate a notion of critique that will demonstrate that it nevertheless does make sense to attribute a critical approach to the Foucaultian writings. Foucault’s critical approach has certain difficulties, but I will argue that it at the same time has certain qualities that can broaden the more traditional account of critique that can be extracted from for example Habermas’ writings. This I will do by (II) demonstrating in what sense it is possible for Foucault to maintain a concept of critique, without having to commit himself on universals. I will show that in Foucault’s writings, critique is understood as reality resisting a conceptual grip – critique is a pointing out of a resistance against or response to the understanding activity. Critique is understood as something that is put upon us. After this I will (III) show that Habermas’ opposition to the position of Foucault springs from a focus on critique as an activity between acting agents. This view is seen in his emphasis on communicative actions and validity claims and in his hesitance towards “natural” reality in discursive matters. But as I will show, this hesitance is rather an effect of than a cause to his basic notion of critique: his latest change in view on reality, has not brought a similar change in the concept of critique. Finally, I will (IV) show how both Foucault and Habermas are important in illuminating the notion of critique – that they complement, rather than exclude, each other.},
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}
In the field of critical philosophy, the view of Michel Foucault has been subject to very extensive discussion. It has been an ongoing puzzlement how he could reject any talk about ahistorical universals and at the same time claim philosophy – at least in its genealogic form – to be of critical importance. How could he claim any analysis to have only local significance, and at the same time take the view that some analyses can show other views to be problematic? According to what standards?A common strategy against Foucault has been to state that he is not as neutral as he claims to be – that underneath his analysis of, say, prison (Discipline and Punish – 1975) or sexuality (The History of Sexuality 1-3 – 1976/1984) there is a hidden universal normativity that shapes his critique of these fields. Another approach to the seemingly paradox claim by Foucault has been to deny the critical aspect of his work. This has been Jürgen Habermas’ strategy – most thoroughly carried out in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985). In the following I will try to articulate a notion of critique that will demonstrate that it nevertheless does make sense to attribute a critical approach to the Foucaultian writings. Foucault’s critical approach has certain difficulties, but I will argue that it at the same time has certain qualities that can broaden the more traditional account of critique that can be extracted from for example Habermas’ writings. This I will do by (II) demonstrating in what sense it is possible for Foucault to maintain a concept of critique, without having to commit himself on universals. I will show that in Foucault’s writings, critique is understood as reality resisting a conceptual grip – critique is a pointing out of a resistance against or response to the understanding activity. Critique is understood as something that is put upon us. After this I will (III) show that Habermas’ opposition to the position of Foucault springs from a focus on critique as an activity between acting agents. This view is seen in his emphasis on communicative actions and validity claims and in his hesitance towards “natural” reality in discursive matters. But as I will show, this hesitance is rather an effect of than a cause to his basic notion of critique: his latest change in view on reality, has not brought a similar change in the concept of critique. Finally, I will (IV) show how both Foucault and Habermas are important in illuminating the notion of critique – that they complement, rather than exclude, each other.
2003
Hansen, Ejvind
Kunstens abstraherende karakter: Om at kvalificere og genindføre diskussionen af kunst Book Section
In: Jørgensen, Simon Laumann; Haunstrup, Thomas; Dalsgaard, Esben (Ed.): Fra Verden til Navlen. Kunsten i funktion, pp. 87-112, Philosophia Press, Aarhus, 2003.
@incollection{Hansen2003,
title = {Kunstens abstraherende karakter: Om at kvalificere og genindføre diskussionen af kunst},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
editor = {Simon Laumann Jørgensen and Thomas Haunstrup and Esben Dalsgaard},
url = {http://www.philosophia.dk/Shop/Tilbud/Fra_verden_til_navlen_kunsten_i_funktion_Antologi_k103_i11.html},
year = {2003},
date = {2003-01-01},
booktitle = {Fra Verden til Navlen. Kunsten i funktion},
pages = {87-112},
publisher = {Philosophia Press},
address = {Aarhus},
abstract = {Jeg vil i denne artikel give et bud på kunstens væsen set fra et filosofisk perspektiv. Jeg vil argumentere for, at ét af kunstens væsenselementer er at være abstrakte – eller måske mere præcist: at virke abstraherende. Dette konkretiseres dels ved det, jeg kalder kunstens grundabstraktion – nemlig frigørelsen fra de daglige basale behov. Dels fremtræder de enkelte kunstværker som abstraktioner i forhold til de daglige genstande. Kunsten bliver – gennem sin genstandslige bestandighed – herved en anfægtelse: Den sætter vores daglige virkelighed i et nyt lys.Jeg forsøger gennem eksempler at vise, at dette bud på kunstens væsen er kendetegnet ved både at være meget rummeligt – uden at miste signifikans. Signifikansen består i, at teorien angiver en måde hvorpå diskussionen af kunst kan kvalificeres. Teoriens værdi består derfor i, at den kan tjene som et redskab i diskussionen af kunst – en diskussion, der indenfor det sidste århundrede pga. manglende kriterier er kendetegnet ved at være meget diffus. Teoriens åbenhed gør, at den kan tjene som et sådant kriterie uden af den grund at lukke diskussionen.},
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Jeg vil i denne artikel give et bud på kunstens væsen set fra et filosofisk perspektiv. Jeg vil argumentere for, at ét af kunstens væsenselementer er at være abstrakte – eller måske mere præcist: at virke abstraherende. Dette konkretiseres dels ved det, jeg kalder kunstens grundabstraktion – nemlig frigørelsen fra de daglige basale behov. Dels fremtræder de enkelte kunstværker som abstraktioner i forhold til de daglige genstande. Kunsten bliver – gennem sin genstandslige bestandighed – herved en anfægtelse: Den sætter vores daglige virkelighed i et nyt lys.Jeg forsøger gennem eksempler at vise, at dette bud på kunstens væsen er kendetegnet ved både at være meget rummeligt – uden at miste signifikans. Signifikansen består i, at teorien angiver en måde hvorpå diskussionen af kunst kan kvalificeres. Teoriens værdi består derfor i, at den kan tjene som et redskab i diskussionen af kunst – en diskussion, der indenfor det sidste århundrede pga. manglende kriterier er kendetegnet ved at være meget diffus. Teoriens åbenhed gør, at den kan tjene som et sådant kriterie uden af den grund at lukke diskussionen.
2001
Hansen, Ejvind
Adorno and History: a Strawinskyan and Heideggerian modification of critical theory Journal Article
In: Sats, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 107–118, 2001.
@article{Hansen2001,
title = {Adorno and History: a Strawinskyan and Heideggerian modification of critical theory},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/sats.2001.2.issue-1/sats.2001.107/sats.2001.107.xml
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/002ado_art.pdf},
year = {2001},
date = {2001-01-01},
journal = {Sats},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {107--118},
abstract = {In this article I want to investigate the relationship between T.W. Adornos general aesthetic theory and his actual view on contemporary art. Adornos view on art is centered around concepts like praxis, matter and critique: Fine art is supposed to make it obvious that any understanding of matter always in some way is inadequate. Praxis is always grounded on an understanding of matter, but in hiding this fact it becomes ideological and repressive. The fine arts have to make this visible – they have to criticize the given praxis. This leads him to reject very big areas of the actual contemporary art – e.g. the music of Igor Strawinsky. I will show that this rejection springs from Adornos view on matters that turns out to be too narrow: His view on matter is too physicalistic. He focuses on the fact that Strawinskys music on the pure audible level is not as radical as for example Schoenbergs music. In this critique I think he overlooks that the music material is not just the audible sound. Strawinskys music appears as new - but only if one realizes how history is part of its material. Adornos being unaware of this leads to a modification (through Heidegger and Strawinsky) of his (and the general marxist) concept of history: The marxist (romanticist) view on history as being one-dimensional shows to be repressive! Adornos own methodology (the negative dialectics) therefore demands a modication of his own view on history – and also of his view on contemporary arts.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In this article I want to investigate the relationship between T.W. Adornos general aesthetic theory and his actual view on contemporary art. Adornos view on art is centered around concepts like praxis, matter and critique: Fine art is supposed to make it obvious that any understanding of matter always in some way is inadequate. Praxis is always grounded on an understanding of matter, but in hiding this fact it becomes ideological and repressive. The fine arts have to make this visible – they have to criticize the given praxis. This leads him to reject very big areas of the actual contemporary art – e.g. the music of Igor Strawinsky. I will show that this rejection springs from Adornos view on matters that turns out to be too narrow: His view on matter is too physicalistic. He focuses on the fact that Strawinskys music on the pure audible level is not as radical as for example Schoenbergs music. In this critique I think he overlooks that the music material is not just the audible sound. Strawinskys music appears as new - but only if one realizes how history is part of its material. Adornos being unaware of this leads to a modification (through Heidegger and Strawinsky) of his (and the general marxist) concept of history: The marxist (romanticist) view on history as being one-dimensional shows to be repressive! Adornos own methodology (the negative dialectics) therefore demands a modication of his own view on history – and also of his view on contemporary arts.