2005
Hansen, Ejvind
Embedded Critique in a Tensed World PhD Thesis
2005.
@phdthesis{Hansen2005d,
title = {Embedded Critique in a Tensed World},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://uploads.ejvindh.net/PhDExtendedAbstract.pdf
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/PhDThesis.pdf},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-01-01},
urldate = {2005-01-01},
abstract = {In this thesis I investigate the conditions for critique in the light of the postmodern insight that critique cannot be based upon a universally valid starting point. A usual reaction to this insight has been what I call descriptivism: if critique cannot have one fixed starting point, it is probably best not to criticize at all. I argue that this reaction is wrong. Descriptivism does on the one hand not solve the problem from which it originates: the description is itself embedded in a contingent validity. The postmodern insight does on the other hand not necessarily lead to absolute relativity: every normative perspective has to respond to some kind of reality, and this can be a starting point for critique. Finally, descriptivism is founded on the mistaken assumption that various normative perspectives are isolated in relation to each other.
I argue that the postmodern insights point towards a moderate relativism as opposed to absolute staticism and absolute relativism. Any linguistic expression (critical as well as descriptive) is characterized by being locally founded, but also by pointing beyond this local foundation. We should therefore think of linguistic expressions as pointing in a universalizing direction but in a fallible way. This is why the critical investigation is always relevant. And it is thuys a mistake to seek to avoid critical implications of linguistic expressions.},
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In this thesis I investigate the conditions for critique in the light of the postmodern insight that critique cannot be based upon a universally valid starting point. A usual reaction to this insight has been what I call descriptivism: if critique cannot have one fixed starting point, it is probably best not to criticize at all. I argue that this reaction is wrong. Descriptivism does on the one hand not solve the problem from which it originates: the description is itself embedded in a contingent validity. The postmodern insight does on the other hand not necessarily lead to absolute relativity: every normative perspective has to respond to some kind of reality, and this can be a starting point for critique. Finally, descriptivism is founded on the mistaken assumption that various normative perspectives are isolated in relation to each other.
I argue that the postmodern insights point towards a moderate relativism as opposed to absolute staticism and absolute relativism. Any linguistic expression (critical as well as descriptive) is characterized by being locally founded, but also by pointing beyond this local foundation. We should therefore think of linguistic expressions as pointing in a universalizing direction but in a fallible way. This is why the critical investigation is always relevant. And it is thuys a mistake to seek to avoid critical implications of linguistic expressions.
I argue that the postmodern insights point towards a moderate relativism as opposed to absolute staticism and absolute relativism. Any linguistic expression (critical as well as descriptive) is characterized by being locally founded, but also by pointing beyond this local foundation. We should therefore think of linguistic expressions as pointing in a universalizing direction but in a fallible way. This is why the critical investigation is always relevant. And it is thuys a mistake to seek to avoid critical implications of linguistic expressions.
Hansen, Ejvind
The Foucault-Habermas Debate: the Reflexive and Receptive Aspects of Critique Journal Article
In: Telos, vol. 130, pp. 63–83, 2005.
@article{Hansen2005b,
title = {The Foucault-Habermas Debate: the Reflexive and Receptive Aspects of Critique},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
url = {http://journal.telospress.com/content/2005/130/63.abstract
http://uploads.ejvindh.net/Philosophy/007JH_MF_telos_facing.pdf},
year = {2005},
date = {2005-01-01},
journal = {Telos},
volume = {130},
pages = {63--83},
abstract = {In the field of critical philosophy, the view of Michel Foucault has been subject to very extensive discussion. It has been an ongoing puzzlement how he could reject any talk about ahistorical universals and at the same time claim philosophy – at least in its genealogic form – to be of critical importance. How could he claim any analysis to have only local significance, and at the same time take the view that some analyses can show other views to be problematic? According to what standards?A common strategy against Foucault has been to state that he is not as neutral as he claims to be – that underneath his analysis of, say, prison (Discipline and Punish – 1975) or sexuality (The History of Sexuality 1-3 – 1976/1984) there is a hidden universal normativity that shapes his critique of these fields. Another approach to the seemingly paradox claim by Foucault has been to deny the critical aspect of his work. This has been Jürgen Habermas’ strategy – most thoroughly carried out in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985). In the following I will try to articulate a notion of critique that will demonstrate that it nevertheless does make sense to attribute a critical approach to the Foucaultian writings. Foucault’s critical approach has certain difficulties, but I will argue that it at the same time has certain qualities that can broaden the more traditional account of critique that can be extracted from for example Habermas’ writings. This I will do by (II) demonstrating in what sense it is possible for Foucault to maintain a concept of critique, without having to commit himself on universals. I will show that in Foucault’s writings, critique is understood as reality resisting a conceptual grip – critique is a pointing out of a resistance against or response to the understanding activity. Critique is understood as something that is put upon us. After this I will (III) show that Habermas’ opposition to the position of Foucault springs from a focus on critique as an activity between acting agents. This view is seen in his emphasis on communicative actions and validity claims and in his hesitance towards “natural” reality in discursive matters. But as I will show, this hesitance is rather an effect of than a cause to his basic notion of critique: his latest change in view on reality, has not brought a similar change in the concept of critique. Finally, I will (IV) show how both Foucault and Habermas are important in illuminating the notion of critique – that they complement, rather than exclude, each other.},
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In the field of critical philosophy, the view of Michel Foucault has been subject to very extensive discussion. It has been an ongoing puzzlement how he could reject any talk about ahistorical universals and at the same time claim philosophy – at least in its genealogic form – to be of critical importance. How could he claim any analysis to have only local significance, and at the same time take the view that some analyses can show other views to be problematic? According to what standards?A common strategy against Foucault has been to state that he is not as neutral as he claims to be – that underneath his analysis of, say, prison (Discipline and Punish – 1975) or sexuality (The History of Sexuality 1-3 – 1976/1984) there is a hidden universal normativity that shapes his critique of these fields. Another approach to the seemingly paradox claim by Foucault has been to deny the critical aspect of his work. This has been Jürgen Habermas’ strategy – most thoroughly carried out in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985). In the following I will try to articulate a notion of critique that will demonstrate that it nevertheless does make sense to attribute a critical approach to the Foucaultian writings. Foucault’s critical approach has certain difficulties, but I will argue that it at the same time has certain qualities that can broaden the more traditional account of critique that can be extracted from for example Habermas’ writings. This I will do by (II) demonstrating in what sense it is possible for Foucault to maintain a concept of critique, without having to commit himself on universals. I will show that in Foucault’s writings, critique is understood as reality resisting a conceptual grip – critique is a pointing out of a resistance against or response to the understanding activity. Critique is understood as something that is put upon us. After this I will (III) show that Habermas’ opposition to the position of Foucault springs from a focus on critique as an activity between acting agents. This view is seen in his emphasis on communicative actions and validity claims and in his hesitance towards “natural” reality in discursive matters. But as I will show, this hesitance is rather an effect of than a cause to his basic notion of critique: his latest change in view on reality, has not brought a similar change in the concept of critique. Finally, I will (IV) show how both Foucault and Habermas are important in illuminating the notion of critique – that they complement, rather than exclude, each other.
Hansen, Ejvind
Indledning til oversættelsen af M. Foucaults Vidensarkæologien Book Section
In: Hansen, Ejvind; Larsen, Thomas (Ed.): Vidensarkæologien, pp. 7–40, Philosophia Press, Aarhus, 2005.
@incollection{Hansen2005c,
title = {Indledning til oversættelsen af M. Foucaults Vidensarkæologien},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
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year = {2005},
date = {2005-01-01},
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2003
Hansen, Ejvind
Kunstens abstraherende karakter: Om at kvalificere og genindføre diskussionen af kunst Book Section
In: Jørgensen, Simon Laumann; Haunstrup, Thomas; Dalsgaard, Esben (Ed.): Fra Verden til Navlen. Kunsten i funktion, pp. 87-112, Philosophia Press, Aarhus, 2003.
@incollection{Hansen2003,
title = {Kunstens abstraherende karakter: Om at kvalificere og genindføre diskussionen af kunst},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
editor = {Simon Laumann Jørgensen and Thomas Haunstrup and Esben Dalsgaard},
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year = {2003},
date = {2003-01-01},
booktitle = {Fra Verden til Navlen. Kunsten i funktion},
pages = {87-112},
publisher = {Philosophia Press},
address = {Aarhus},
abstract = {Jeg vil i denne artikel give et bud på kunstens væsen set fra et filosofisk perspektiv. Jeg vil argumentere for, at ét af kunstens væsenselementer er at være abstrakte – eller måske mere præcist: at virke abstraherende. Dette konkretiseres dels ved det, jeg kalder kunstens grundabstraktion – nemlig frigørelsen fra de daglige basale behov. Dels fremtræder de enkelte kunstværker som abstraktioner i forhold til de daglige genstande. Kunsten bliver – gennem sin genstandslige bestandighed – herved en anfægtelse: Den sætter vores daglige virkelighed i et nyt lys.Jeg forsøger gennem eksempler at vise, at dette bud på kunstens væsen er kendetegnet ved både at være meget rummeligt – uden at miste signifikans. Signifikansen består i, at teorien angiver en måde hvorpå diskussionen af kunst kan kvalificeres. Teoriens værdi består derfor i, at den kan tjene som et redskab i diskussionen af kunst – en diskussion, der indenfor det sidste århundrede pga. manglende kriterier er kendetegnet ved at være meget diffus. Teoriens åbenhed gør, at den kan tjene som et sådant kriterie uden af den grund at lukke diskussionen.},
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Jeg vil i denne artikel give et bud på kunstens væsen set fra et filosofisk perspektiv. Jeg vil argumentere for, at ét af kunstens væsenselementer er at være abstrakte – eller måske mere præcist: at virke abstraherende. Dette konkretiseres dels ved det, jeg kalder kunstens grundabstraktion – nemlig frigørelsen fra de daglige basale behov. Dels fremtræder de enkelte kunstværker som abstraktioner i forhold til de daglige genstande. Kunsten bliver – gennem sin genstandslige bestandighed – herved en anfægtelse: Den sætter vores daglige virkelighed i et nyt lys.Jeg forsøger gennem eksempler at vise, at dette bud på kunstens væsen er kendetegnet ved både at være meget rummeligt – uden at miste signifikans. Signifikansen består i, at teorien angiver en måde hvorpå diskussionen af kunst kan kvalificeres. Teoriens værdi består derfor i, at den kan tjene som et redskab i diskussionen af kunst – en diskussion, der indenfor det sidste århundrede pga. manglende kriterier er kendetegnet ved at være meget diffus. Teoriens åbenhed gør, at den kan tjene som et sådant kriterie uden af den grund at lukke diskussionen.
2001
Hansen, Ejvind
Adorno and History: a Strawinskyan and Heideggerian modification of critical theory Journal Article
In: Sats, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 107–118, 2001.
@article{Hansen2001,
title = {Adorno and History: a Strawinskyan and Heideggerian modification of critical theory},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
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year = {2001},
date = {2001-01-01},
journal = {Sats},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {107--118},
abstract = {In this article I want to investigate the relationship between T.W. Adornos general aesthetic theory and his actual view on contemporary art. Adornos view on art is centered around concepts like praxis, matter and critique: Fine art is supposed to make it obvious that any understanding of matter always in some way is inadequate. Praxis is always grounded on an understanding of matter, but in hiding this fact it becomes ideological and repressive. The fine arts have to make this visible – they have to criticize the given praxis. This leads him to reject very big areas of the actual contemporary art – e.g. the music of Igor Strawinsky. I will show that this rejection springs from Adornos view on matters that turns out to be too narrow: His view on matter is too physicalistic. He focuses on the fact that Strawinskys music on the pure audible level is not as radical as for example Schoenbergs music. In this critique I think he overlooks that the music material is not just the audible sound. Strawinskys music appears as new - but only if one realizes how history is part of its material. Adornos being unaware of this leads to a modification (through Heidegger and Strawinsky) of his (and the general marxist) concept of history: The marxist (romanticist) view on history as being one-dimensional shows to be repressive! Adornos own methodology (the negative dialectics) therefore demands a modication of his own view on history – and also of his view on contemporary arts.},
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In this article I want to investigate the relationship between T.W. Adornos general aesthetic theory and his actual view on contemporary art. Adornos view on art is centered around concepts like praxis, matter and critique: Fine art is supposed to make it obvious that any understanding of matter always in some way is inadequate. Praxis is always grounded on an understanding of matter, but in hiding this fact it becomes ideological and repressive. The fine arts have to make this visible – they have to criticize the given praxis. This leads him to reject very big areas of the actual contemporary art – e.g. the music of Igor Strawinsky. I will show that this rejection springs from Adornos view on matters that turns out to be too narrow: His view on matter is too physicalistic. He focuses on the fact that Strawinskys music on the pure audible level is not as radical as for example Schoenbergs music. In this critique I think he overlooks that the music material is not just the audible sound. Strawinskys music appears as new - but only if one realizes how history is part of its material. Adornos being unaware of this leads to a modification (through Heidegger and Strawinsky) of his (and the general marxist) concept of history: The marxist (romanticist) view on history as being one-dimensional shows to be repressive! Adornos own methodology (the negative dialectics) therefore demands a modication of his own view on history – and also of his view on contemporary arts.
1997
Hansen, Ejvind
Højskolesangens melodiudvikling Journal Article
In: Højskolebladet, vol. 13, pp. 204–205, 1997.
@article{Hansen1997,
title = {Højskolesangens melodiudvikling},
author = { Ejvind Hansen},
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year = {1997},
date = {1997-01-01},
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